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Abstract. The security of cyber-physical systems, from self-driving cars
to medical devices, depends on their underlying multi-hop wireless net-
works. Yet, the lack of trusted central infrastructures and limited nodes’
resources make securing these networks challenging. Recent works on
key pre-distribution schemes, where nodes communicate over encrypted
overlay paths, provide an appealing solution because of their distributed,
computationally light-weight nature. Alas, these schemes share a glaring
security vulnerability: the two ends of every overlay link can decrypt—
and potentially modify and alter—the message. Plus, the longer overlay
paths impose traffic overhead and increase latency.
We present a novel routing mechanism, KPsec, to address these issues.
KPsec deploys multiple disjoint paths and an initial key-exchange phase
to secure end-to-end communications. After the initial key-exchange phase,
traffic in KPsec follows the shortest paths and, in contrast to key pre-
distribution schemes, intermediate nodes cannot decrypt it. We measure
the security and performance of KPsec as well as three state-of-the-art
key pre-distribution schemes using a real 10-node testbed and large-scale
simulations. Our experiments show that, in addition to its security bene-
fits, KPsec results in 5−15% improvement in network throughput, up to
75% reduction in latency, and an order of magnitude reduction in energy
consumption.
Keywords: Secure end-to-end communication · multi-hop wireless net-
work· key pre-distribution· performance evaluation.
1 Introduction
Cyber physical systems (CPS) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical sys-
tems such as self-driving cars [20]. While most of such systems could be imple-
mented with expensive infrastructure, the better solution is to implement them
based on the peer-to-peer network node cooperation [21]. Smart intersections,
where the cars never stop at a red light unless there will be actual crossing traffic,
is an instance [5]. Vehicle to vehicle communication is another example while it
can potentially help to prevent 74% of all traffic accidents including those with
drivers impaired by alcohol or drowsiness, as reported by national highway traffic
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safety administration of the U.S. [30]. To be able to rely on these systems, the
security of the underlying multi-hop wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc
networks (MANET), vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET), and wireless sensor
networks (WSN), is critical. Alas, the lack of trusted infrastructures and lim-
ited node resources make securing communications in such networks challenging.
Concretely, while cryptography is a general and powerful approach to improve
security, it is not well suited for such networks. This is because cryptography
techniques, such as public key infrastructure (PKI), commonly rely on a key
management system and most of the key management tasks are assigned to a
trusted third party (TTP) or several distributed TTPs that are based on in-
frastructure. In contrast, multi-hop wireless networks in cyber-physical systems
are fully decentralized and lack a fixed infrastructure that can act as the TTP.
Plus, nodes in such networks have limited memory, computational, and trans-
mission resources. Consequently, the naive solution of storing all keys in every
single node for encrypting and decrypting messages is also not practical in these
networks, especially in large-scale ones.
Key pre-distribution schemes [9] seem to be a promising solution due to
their distributed and lightweight nature. Key pre-distribution schemes store just
k keys in each node, where k << n and n is the number of network nodes.
The set of stored keys in each node is referred to as its keyring. Once a node
encrypts a message with a key, only those nodes with a shared key are capable
of decrypting it. Thus, a pair of nodes can communicate directly and securely if
they share a common key. To establish a secure connection between two nodes
without a shared key, a key-path has to be found. The key-path is an overlay
path in which each pair of adjacent nodes have a secure link between them3, i.e.,
they share a common key. To exchange messages, the source initially encrypts
its message and forwards it to the first hop on the overlay. The message is then
routed over the overlay where each intermediate hop, in turn, decrypts the data,
encrypts it again with a key shared with the next hop, and forwards it to the
next hop toward the destination.
Despite important differences between various classes of key pre-distribution
techniques (such as symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems) in terms of their
routing mechanisms and the process of forming secure overlays (§2), they fun-
damentally share a security vulnerability, known as intermediate D-E steps or
per hop key exposure [32] where the intermediate nodes on the key-path overlay
can decrypt and encrypt messages. Since an attacker can compromise an in-
termediate node, any decryption-encryption (D-E) step raises a security threat.
While enhancing the link-level security of the key pre-distribution schemes has
been the focus of many recent works [7,23,33,34,11,31], the holistic, end-to-end
security of these schemes is relatively unexplored. In addition to this security
concern, the performance of key pre-distribution schemes is not ideal because
their overlay paths are commonly longer than the physical shortest paths. The
resulted path stretch leads to performance degradation, e.g., increased latency
and network overhead, as we quantify in §4.
3 Note that this secure overlay link may span multiple physical nodes, in reality.
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In this paper, we propose Key Pre-distribution security (KPsec), a high-
performance algorithm to establish end-to-end secure communications in multi-
hop wireless networks. Under KPsec, the source and the destination first engage
in an initial phase of exchanging public keys via multiple disjoint paths. KPsec
leverages a state-of-the-art asymmetric key pre-distribution technique, proba-
bilistic asymmetric key pre-distribution (PAKP) [12], as a building block to
initially exchange public keys. This step is followed by constructing shared keys
for this communicating pair before they start secure communication over the
shortest paths. Despite the initialization cost and delay, we show that the amor-
tized latency overhead is low in our scheme compared to the state-of-the-art.
This is because upon constructing a common key, under KPsec, traffic follows
the shortest path, in lieu of the longer overlays deployed in key pre-distribution
techniques. KPsec is not subject to passive attacks due to exchanging only public
keys. Moreover, we show that it has high resiliency against active attacks (§4).
Concretely, the core idea of KPsec is an initial key exchange process that re-
sults in a pairwise key agreement4 between the source and destination. After the
completion of the key-exchange phase, messages between these two nodes will
be encrypted using this key and can be decrypted only by the source and the
destination. Thus, these messages can be routed over the shortest physical paths,
avoiding the longer key-path overlays without compromising security. Applied
naively, this technique is prone to man-in-the-middle attacks where an interme-
diate node that participates in the key-exchange process replaces the actual key
with its own key. In such a case, the intermediate node can read and potentially
alter the message while remaining hidden from the source and the destination.
To increase the resiliency against this type of attack, nodes in KPsec exchange
keys via multiple, and disjoint, paths using erasure coding (§3).
Despite its security and performance benefits, KPsec causes a few concerns.
First, while path redundancy improves security, the communication can still be
vulnerable to more sophisticated forms of attack such as distributed, coordi-
nated man-in-the-middle attacks where a group of compromised nodes agrees on
a forged key to replace the actual key. We experimentally show that KPsec has
strong resiliency against this type of attack: the attacker needs to compromise
O(n) nodes to be able to get access to the secret data. Second, for the pro-
posed algorithm to work, there must be enough reasonably short overlay vertex
disjoint paths for the initial step of exchanging keys. In Section (3), we inves-
tigate the expected number and lengths of these paths. Our results show that,
although a large number of disjoint paths improves security, KPsec results in
high degrees of security even with small number of such paths, e.g., for rela-
tively short paths with 3 D-E steps, KPsec’s use of only 5 disjoint paths leads to
99.9% resiliency against node capture (§3). Third, the initial key-exchange phase
causes some control overhead. Our measurements show that the amortized traffic
overhead is low. This is because once the key-exchange phase terminates, traffic
follows the shortest paths, eliminating the path stretch and compensating for
the commencing control overhead. For a network with 100 nodes, for example,
4 We show in §4 the energy efficiency enabled by this approach.
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KPsec results in almost equal control traffic compared to three state-of-the-art
key pre-distribution schemes that we use as baselines and 7.5% enhancement in
throughput (§4).
To comprehensively evaluate the performance and security of KPsec, we im-
plement it on a 10-node testbed and a large-scale ns-2 network simulator [2].
In addition to KPsec, we implement three state-of-the-art key pre-distribution
schemes: PAKP [12], unital key pre-distribution (UKP) [6], and strong Steiner
trade (SST) [27]. Moreover, to make the end-to-end connections in UKP and SST
secure, we augment these algorithms using the design presented in [18] (here-
after called augmented UKP and SST), a general remedy for the intermediate
D-E steps problem which is applicable to any symmetric key pre-distribution
scheme. Our experiments show that, compared to these baselines, KPsec results
in 5− 15% throughput improvement, reduces the network latency by 50− 75%,
and alleviates the energy consumption up to an order of magnitude.
Although the performance of KPsec and augmented UKP and SST are close,
KPsec results in substantial security improvements, as it is the only scheme that
is secure against passive attacks. Plus, an active attacker needs to compromise
O(n) nodes to access data in KPsec, a substantially larger fraction compared to
augmented UKP and SST. Moreover, contrary to other schemes that suffer from
the secret information leakage, compromising a few nodes in KPsec does not en-
able an attacker to access any secret information. Finally, while in other schemes,
sophisticated attackers such as those carrying out selective node compromise at-
tacks can compromise the entire network communications by capturing only a
few nodes, in KPsec, compromising the entire network requires the attacker to
capture O(n) nodes, e.g., in a network with 100 nodes, to access data, the at-
tacker needs to capture, respectively, 10 and 23 nodes in augmented UKP and
SST, compared to 99 nodes in KPsec.
The main contribution of this paper is KPsec, an algorithm to establish end-
to-end secure communication in multi-hop wireless networks, and its thorough
evaluation. More specifically, this paper proposes an algorithm to address the
two key pre-distribution shortcomings, intermediate D-E steps, and the path
stretch and studies its security and performance compared to the state-of-the-
art algorithms using a real 10-node testbed and large-scale simulations.
2 Related Work
Key pre-distribution schemes are categorized into two main categories based on
their underlying cryptosystem, symmetric and asymmetric. In this section, we
provide a brief comparison of these categories, the state-of-the-art techniques
for each, and proposals for secure end-to-end communications using key pre-
distribution in turn.
2.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Key Pre-distribution
The core idea of symmetric key pre-distribution schemes, which is also known as
pairwise key pre-distribution, was first introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [9].
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 5
In this scheme, each keyring is chosen uniformly at random from a key-pool, with
replacement. The main security shortcoming of the Eschenauer-Gligor design is
that if an attacker compromises several nodes, it can access many keys from
the key-pool. Thus, many links inside the network become insecure. Chan et
al. [7] propose Q-composite algorithm to mitigate this security shortcoming by
establishing secure links only between nodes that have at least q common keys.
More recently, the concept of combinatorial block design is used in [6,27]
to build key pre-distribution schemes. Bechkit et al. [6] propose a key pre-
distribution scheme based on unital block design, referred to as naive unital key
pre-distribution (NU-KP). The proposed scheme has a low key-sharing probabil-
ity: O( 1
k
). To improve this probability, they suggest to pre-load each node with
t disjoint blocks and refer to the new design as t-UKP. Ruj et al. [27] propose
a method to construct strong Steiner trade (SST), a form of block design, and
use it as a key pre-distribution scheme. SST establishes a unique secret pairwise
key between nodes. It is proven that the probability of sharing such a pairwise
key does not exceed 0.25 [6]. In our evaluations, we implement 2-UKP and SST
as two well-known baseline schemes.
Liu et al. [24] introduce the idea of asymmetric key pre-distribution, relying
on some keying material servers. Multi-hop wireless networks, however, do not al-
ways have access to keying servers. Probabilistic asymmetric key pre-distribution
(PAKP) was subsequently proposed to consider this problem [12]. In this scheme,
each node stores k public keys chosen uniformly at random with replacement,
from a key-pool containing all the public keys. In [12], authors prove that in
PAKP, for any k ≥ 3, the probability of key-path existence is more than 99.9%,
where the impact of increasing the number of nodes is negligible. They further
prove that PAKP reduces the average number of D-E steps to O(logk n). In com-
parison, this number is in the order of the physical path length in symmetric key
pre-distribution schemes. In contrast to the random key distribution, authors of
[13] and [4] propose and analyze several more realistic scenarios for asymmetric
key distribution.
While the general paradigm of key pre-distribution is similar for both categories—
symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems—the routing policies of these two cat-
egories have significant differences. In symmetric systems, a key-pool containing
all the secret keys is formed. Any node is pre-loaded with a keyring chosen from
the key-pool. During a shared key discovery process, any two adjacent nodes
discover their secure link by checking whether they share a common key or not.
Accordingly, to find a secure path from the source node to the destination, a
physical path is first found. Subsequently, for any physical hop, if there is no
secure link, a key-path is found. The transferred data is then encrypted by the
source node, decrypted and encrypted again by each intermediate node until
reaching the destination.
In asymmetric key pre-distribution, on the other hand, the routing mecha-
nism follows a reverse process: the key-pool is formed by the public keys of all
nodes. Each node is pre-loaded by k public keys chosen uniformly at random
with replacement from the pool. Initially, a key-path from the source node to
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the destination has to be found. Subsequently, for any key-path hop, the corre-
sponding physical path is selected. In this case, each key-path hop may contain
several physical hops without decryption and encryption steps, since the overlay
neighbors may be physically far away. Generally, there are three main differ-
ences between symmetric and asymmetric key pre-distribution schemes. First,
the routing process follows a reverse routing procedure. Second, the distributed
keys are not confidential. Third, the overlay links in asymmetric schemes are
directed.
In a key pre-distribution scheme, regardless of the symmetric or asymmetric
nature of its relaying cryptosystem, there are some intermediate nodes which
decrypt the data, encrypt it again, and forward it toward the destination. Since
the adversary node may forge itself as an intermediate node, any D-E step is
considered as a security threat. Moreover, the resulted path may also be longer
than the shortest physical path, due to the absence of a direct secure link, which
leads to performance degradation. We provide more details about these two
categories of key pre-distribution techniques below.
2.2 End-to-End Communication
While the intermediate D-E steps problem was first introduced in [32], this work
does not propose a solution. To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm of
[18] is the first well-defined end-to-end solution for intermediate D-E steps. In
this solution, the source node chooses a pairwise key, splits it into ρ pieces,
and sends each piece via different node-disjoint paths to the destination. In this
way, the attacker needs to compromise at least one node from each node-disjoint
path to retrieve the entire pairwise key and decrypt the data. To improve the
performance of [18], Li et al. [22] suggest using intermediate nodes as proxies,
and then use multiple paths, each path with just one proxy, to send the key
pieces. Gupta et al. [17] propose their algorithm based on [22] by introducing
some proxies as friends. They then use a publicly known function and only the
key pieces of the friends to retrieve the pairwise key. Sheu et al. [28] propose
using a group-based pairwise key to enhance the security of node-disjoint paths.
However, this algorithm requires a group-key agreement. A security shortcoming
shared across all these algorithms is their reliance on sending secret values (e.g.,
private keys) through hop-by-hop D-E steps to establish a pairwise key. The at-
tacker will be able to access these values, and consequently encrypted messages,
via compromising the intermediate nodes. Similar to KPsec, [25] strives to es-
tablish end-to-end secure communications by providing disjoint overlay paths.
Unlike KPsec, however, it relies on a backbone infrastructure.
3 KPsec: end-to-end secure communications
KPsec is, in essence, a three-phase algorithm—the source and the destination
initially engage in a public key exchange process to build a common key (phases
1 and 2). Their messages are then encoded using this key and routed, securely
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and efficiently, over shortest paths (phase 3). After presenting an overview of
the algorithm, we analyze its key aspects such as the number and the length of
disjoint key-paths and its resilience against cooperative attacks in turn.
3.1 The Three Phases of KPsec
In the first phase, the goal of the source is to send its public key to the destination
efficiently and securely. For this, KPsec leverages multiple vertex-disjoint paths
and the notion of erasure coding. Erasure code, a method originally developed
for forward error correction code under bit erasures, transforms a message into
a longer coded message with redundant data pieces. This coded message is then
broken into ρ shares such that the original message can be recovered from any θ
shares. After encoding and splitting its public key, KPsec then sends the ρ shares
to the destination over vertex disjoint paths. Splitting the key into ρ shares and
sending them over disjoint paths make the system more resilient against the
man-in-the-middle attack—the attacker needs to compromise more nodes to be
able to forge the public key.
In the second phase, the destination node collects the shares and extracts the
public key of the source. It then encrypts its own public key using the public key
of the source and sends this encrypted message via the shortest physical path
toward the source.
In the third and final phase, both the source and the destination calculate
a pairwise key. The source node then encrypts its data using the pairwise key
and sends it toward the destination. The destination, in turn, decrypts the data
using the same pairwise key. Although we could use any asymmetric cryptog-
raphy algorithm, we deployed elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [1] because of
its shorter key length and lower computational complexity compared to other
asymmetric cryptography algorithms. In the rest of this section, after outlin-
ing our assumptions, we describe the details of each phase. Table (1) lists the
notations that we will use throughout this paper.
Assumption 1 The asymmetric cryptosystem security strength is such that,
by having the public key and other public parameters, the attacker is unable to
compute the private key.
Assumption 2 When there is more than one path toward the destination and
the source node randomly chooses one of them, the attacker cannot guess which
path is chosen.
Phase 1: The source node chooses θ random numbers a1, a2, . . . , aθ and
forms the following formula:
P (x) = ysrc + a1x+ a2x
2 + . . .+ aθx
θ. (1)
This polynomial is used for coding where P (0) is the public key of the source
node. The source node calculates P (i), i = 1, 2, . . . , ρ and then calculates sign(P (i))
which is the value of P (i) signed by the private key of the source node. It could
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Table 1. The table of notations.
n Number of network nodes
k Size of key-ring
ρ Sufficient number of vertex-disjoint paths
θ Threshold for the number of duplicated keys
P (i) Erasure code polynomial in the order of θ
P Set of collected shares by the destination
xi Private key of node i
yi Public key of node i
ksd The source-destination pairwise key
be used to certify the correctness of the shares. The source node then sends each
tuple (i, P (i), sign(P (i))) from the ith vertex-disjoint overlay path.
Phase 2: In this phase, the destination collects θ shares and forms the set
P . It then calculates the public key of the source node as
P (0) =
∑
i∈P
P (i)li, (2)
where li is Lagrange multiplier and could be calculated as
li =
∏
j∈P,j 6=i
(0− j)
(i − j) . (3)
Note that the computational complexity of the mentioned erasure code is O(θ2).
If θ = ρ, the Lagrange multipliers become unique and thus each node can simply
store them. In this case, the computational complexity of the code reduces to
O(θ). By calculating the public key of the source node, the destination node
can certify the shares by checking the sign of each share. The destination then
encrypts its own public key with the public key of the source node and sends it
through the shortest physical path. The source node decrypts the destination’s
public key. At this point, both ends have exchanged their public keys.
Phase 3: In principle, the source is now able to communicate with the desti-
nation directly and securely, using asymmetric encryption. However, asymmet-
ric encryption is known to be computationally complex and energy inefficient.
Therefore, it is not an ideal choice for multi-hop wireless networks. KPsec uses
symmetric encryption instead: upon receiving each other’s public key, source and
destination nodes calculate a pairwise key ksd:
ksd = xs.yd = xd.ys. (4)
Since in ECC the corresponding public key for the private key x is calculated
as y = x.G where G is the elliptic cure base point, the pairwise key ksd will
be identical for both the source and the destination nodes. After this step, the
source node can encrypt its data using the pairwise key and then sends it to
the destination via the shortest physical path. The destination can also use the
same key to decrypt the received data.
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KPsec raises a few concerns. Specifically, the first phase of the algorithm relies
on a number of disjoint paths. Its operation, security, and performance, therefore,
hinges on the existence and lengths of such paths. Moreover, the resilience of the
algorithm against cooperative attacks, where the attacker controls a fraction of
all nodes, is not known. In the rest of this section, we perform a comprehensive
analysis to address these concerns.
3.2 Number and length of Vertex-Disjoint Key-Paths
Before calculating the number and the length of vertex-disjoint overlay paths in
the KPsec algorithm, we need to know how many vertex-disjoint paths KPsec
requires. Equivalently, what is the proper value for parameter ρ? Furthermore,
we need to know how we can find a set of vertex-disjoint paths. To answer the
first question, we use the reliability analysis technique of [29], referred to as the
reliability of the series-parallel systems. In this technique, the reliability of the
system is considered as the probability of system success which is equal to one
minus the probability of attacker success.
Lemma 1. Consider the probability of each intermediate node to be compro-
mised as p, the reliability of multi-path systems is equal to
R = 1− (1− (1 − p)#DE)ρ, (5)
where #DE represents the number of intermediate D-E steps in each path.
Proof. In this analysis, each intermediate D-E step is considered as a reliability
threat. Hence, for a path to be reliable, it should be empty of any compromised
node. Hence, the reliability of each path is equal to (1 − p)#DE . The attacker
has to compromise at least an intermediate node from each path to potentially
becomes able to perform a successful attack. The probability of attacker success
in each path is one minus the reliability of that path, i.e. 1− (1− p)#DE . For ρ
disjoint paths, hence, the total reliability is equal to
R = 1− (1− (1 − p)#DE)ρ. (6)
Fig. (1) shows the quantitative results of Equation (5) for a network with 10%
of nodes being compromised, selected uniformly at random, i.e. p = 0.1. While
increasing the number of paths improves security, Fig. (1) shows that after the
first several paths, the security improvement of adding extra paths is negligible.
To find the set of vertex-disjoint paths between any pair of source and desti-
nation vertices, we use the Ford-Fulkerson max-flow algorithm [19,10]. We know
that the upper bound of the number of vertex-disjoint paths is k, because each
node stores just k keys, i.e. the source node has only k neighbors in the overlay.
The Ford-Fulkerson max-flow algorithm is known as a greedy algorithm capable
of finding the set with the maximum number of edge-disjoint paths. However,
our problem is to find the set of vertex-disjoint paths, not edge-disjoint. To find
such a set, we modify this algorithm by replacing each vertex in our graph with
two vertices which are connected with a directed edge, with a capacity of one.
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Fig. 1. The resiliency of multi-disjoint-path solutions against node capture.
Lemma 2. Consider directed graph G(V,E), where V and E denote sets of
vertices and edges, respectively, and the capacity of all edges is one. We modify
G to form a new graph G′(V ′, E′) by replacing each vertex vi with two vertices
vi1 and vi2 and an edge from vi1 to vi2 with capacity one. Applying the Ford-
Fulkerson algorithm on the modified graph results in a set with maximum number
of vertex-disjoint paths in the main graph.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that the result of the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm
on graph G′ does not return the maximum number of vertex-disjoint paths in
graph G. This implies that there is at least a flow in graph G′ which passes
through node vi1 and then another node v
′
i2 instead of passing vi2. This, however,
contradicts our assumption about G′ since in G′, there exists only a single edge
with capacity one from each node vi1 to vi2. This is a contradiction and hence the
results of the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm on the graph G′ returns the maximum
number of vertex-disjoint paths in G.
Fig. (2) shows the average number of disjoint paths and the distribution of
their length. Fig. (2a) that includes the results for different numbers of nodes and
different k values shows two important facts. First, the number of vertex-disjoint
paths is very close to the value of k. Second, increasing the number of nodes has
a negligible impact on the number of vertex-disjoint paths. Collectively, Fig. (1)
and Fig. (2a) indicate that, with high probability, there will be enough number
of vertex-disjoint paths for KPsec’s operations.
Fig. (2b) shows the distribution function of disjoint path length for different
k values in a graph with 1000 nodes. This parameter is of paramount importance
for the KPsec algorithm as a performance as well as a security metric. Although
the encrypted data in the proposed algorithm follows the shortest physical path
toward the destination, longer key-path length for vertex-disjoint paths leads to
more network controlling traffic during the key-exchange process. Plus, longer
key-paths mean more intermediate D-E steps and more vulnerability against
cooperative attacks. Fig. (2b) shows that the length of the most vertex-disjoint
paths is very close to the minimum key-path length reported in [12] and increas-
ing the value of k decreases the average key-path length and its variance which
implies that the length of most disjoint key-paths is close to the average length.
While not reported here, we investigate the same scenario for a fix k value and
different numbers of network nodes. The results are similar to those of Fig. (2b).
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Fig. 3. Secure vertex-disjoint paths for different ratios of adversary nodes.
3.3 Resiliency Against Cooperative Attacks
In this part, we investigate the resiliency of the proposed algorithm against
the cooperative attacks. In our analysis, we consider the resiliency against the
cooperative man-in-the-middle attack, as one of the most known harmful attacks
against multi-path solutions. However, our method can be generalized to any
cooperative attacks. To model this attack, we introduce adversary nodes to the
network and then calculate the number of those vertex-disjoint paths that do
not contain any adversary node. We select the adversary nodes uniformly at
random in our simulations. Fig. (3) shows the average and standard deviation
of the number of secure vertex-disjoint paths.
Note that this parameter has to be analyzed together with parameter θ. Re-
call that θ represents the number of required shares to rebuild the source node’s
public key. Let θ = ρ, i.e., the destination requires all the shares from all the
paths to become able to reconstruct the key. Thus, for the attacker to success-
fully perform its cooperative man-in-the-middle attack, it needs to compromise
at least one node from every single path. According to Fig. (3), the attacker
needs to compromise more than half of the network nodes to become success-
ful. Decreasing the value of θ makes the system more resilient to failures, but
it increases the probability of successful attacks. Nevertheless, even for θ = ρ
2
,
the attacker needs to compromise more than 20% of nodes to perform a suc-
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cessful attack. Considering the results of Fig. (3) for different values of k, we
can conclude that for θ = c1ρ, the attacker always needs to compromise c2n
nodes to perform a successful attack, where c1 and c2 are scaling constants, i.e.
0 < c1, c2 < 1. Hence, the attacker needs to compromise O(n) nodes, even for
small θ values.
4 Experimental Testbed and Simulation Results
In order to evaluate the performance and security of KPsec in real systems
and at scale, we implement it in a 10-node testbed as well as a large-scale ns-2
simulator[2]. We implement KPsec and three state-of-the-art key pre-distribution
schemes, PAKP [12], SST [27], and 2-UKP [6]. We select a combination of both
symmetric and asymmetric schemes to make a fair comparison. As we mentioned
in §3, PAKP [12] is an asymmetric key pre-distribution scheme with a high prob-
ability of connectivity and a logarithmic number of D-E steps. However, it suffers
from high energy consumption. Both of 2-UKP [6] and SST[27] are symmetric
key pre-distribution schemes. 2-UKP has a high key sharing probability and con-
sequently a shorter key-path. However, compromising a few numbers of nodes
in this scheme leads to the compromise of many connections. In contrast, SST
has a low key sharing probability that does not exceed 0.25 which means longer
key-path and consequently lower performance.
To make the connections of SST and UKP end-to-end secure, we augment
these schemes with the algorithm of [18]. For performance parameters, we mea-
sure the average throughput, the overall network routing traffic, the key-exchange
routing traffic overhead, the end-to-end latency, the key-exchange delay, and the
energy consumed for decryption and encryption. For security metrics, we mea-
sure the number of intermediate D-E steps, the resiliency against cooperative
attacks, the resiliency against passive attacks, and the resiliency against selec-
tive node compromise. The rest of this section is divided into four parts dis-
cussing testbed experiments, simulation settings, performance evaluation, and
the comparison of the security strengths of different techniques.
4.1 Experimental Testbed
In our 10-node testbed experiment, each node stores 3 keys where two disjoint
paths are used for the key exchange process. We used 10 laptops to perform the
experiment by connecting them in an ad-hoc mode via a 5 Megahertz (MHz)
wireless channel, 2.412-2.417 GHz. In each scenario, a 5 Megabytes (MB) file is
sent from a specific source node to a specific destination. To make a fair compari-
son, we considered the same physical arrangement for all scenarios. We measured
the time of the key-exchange process and the time between sending the first data
packet by the source and receiving the last packet by the destination. The over-
all end-to-end latency is the summation of these times. We further measured
the control traffic required for the key-exchange process in each algorithm. The
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Table 2. Experimental testbed results.
Key-Exch. Data End-to-End Key-Exch. Throughput D-E
Algorithm Delay Transmission Latency Traffic (Mbps) Steps
(Sec) Latency(Sec) (Sec) (KB) (per path)
Aug. UKP 13.98 214.57 228.55 436.85 0.9873 1
Aug. SST 48.83 274.60 323.43 948.84 0.9579 3.5
KPsec 16.06 209.92 225.98 868.88 0.999 1
throughput is also measured as the packet delivery ratio over the bandwidth.
Table (2) shows the result of our testbed experiments.
Due to the low key-sharing probability of SST (discussed in §2), the key-path
in this scheme is significantly longer than other schemes. This fact leads to longer
key exchange delay and higher key exchange traffic. Since, in all cases, the data
follows the shortest physical path to reach the destination, the data transmission
latency and throughput are expected to yield similar results. However, due to
the network traffic and latency caused by the key-exchange process, we observe
lower throughput for the augmented SST algorithm.
4.2 Simulation Setting
To evaluate the algorithm at scale, we use the ns-2 simulator. In each scenario,
a network with a number of nodes (ranging from 100 to 200) is simulated in a
300× 300 square meter area. Network nodes are initiated in random positions,
using a uniform distribution in the network area. The nodes are assumed to be
mobile and follow Random walk mobility model of ns-2, with zero pause time
and varying speed in the interval [0 5] meter per second. The distance model is
chosen for sending and receiving with the communication range of 100 meters for
each node. The channel bandwidth is set to 1Mbps. All simulations are performed
using AODV routing protocol to find the shortest physical path. For two-layer
routing in PAKP, the algorithm of [14] is used to find the optimal path with the
smallest number of D-E steps and shortest physical lengths. Different scenarios
are simulated with different numbers of connections between 10 and 20. To keep
the comparisons fair, all connections are chosen randomly but once selected, the
same connections are used for comparing different schemes. The generated traffic
is FTP running on TCP Tahoe. In each connection, the source node sends a file
with a size of 5MB to its destination. All simulations are repeated 20 times, and
figures show average values calculated over all runs. For the key pre-distribution
phase, the keyring size is set to k = 10, and for end-to-end algorithms, we use
five disjoint paths in each scenario.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
We choose the network throughput measured for successful packet delivery, the
average end-to-end latency per connection, the average key-exchange delay, the
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Fig. 4. A comparison of the average network throughput.
average routing traffic per connection, the key-exchange routing traffic, and
the consumed energy as performance evaluation metrics. Fig. (4) compares the
throughput of different scenarios. While Fig. (4a) shows the average through-
put for 10 fixed connections and the different number of nodes, Fig. (4b) shows
the results for different numbers of connections in a 100-nodes setting. Since in-
creasing the number of connections increases congestion, the network through-
put is slightly decreased as the number of connections increases. We observe
that the factor that impacts the network throughput the most is the physical
path length. Since, in end-to-end solutions, the data traffic follows the shortest
physical path, KPsec’s throughput is higher in comparison with SST, 2-UKP,
and simple PAKP, as shown in Fig. (4). It is worth noting that augmented SST
and augmented UKP have similar throughput as KPsec. Since 2-UKP has a
significantly higher number of overlay edges, it has the shortest physical path
among the compared schemes. This fact leads to 2-UKP outperforming other key
pre-distribution schemes. An improvement of more than 7.5% is also notable for
KPsec compared to PAKP.
We next measure the average end-to-end latency per connection. Each con-
nection starts at a time randomly chosen within the interval [0, 60] seconds. The
end-to-end latency for each connection ends when the destination receives the
last packet of the file. The average latency per connection is shown in Fig. (5) for
different numbers of nodes and connections. Consistent with our testbed results,
all the end-to-end solutions exhibit similar performance. KPsec shows significant
improvement of more than 50% compared to SST, 2-UKP, and PAKP. While
PAKP slightly improves the performance compared to SST, 2-UKP outperforms
both of them.
We also measure the key-exchange delay. Fig. (6) shows the results for dif-
ferent numbers of nodes and connections. Recall that the key-exchange process
in KPsec has one additional step in comparison with the algorithm of [18]. In
KPsec, after receiving key shares, the destination node encrypts its public key
and sends it to the source node. This extra step imposes some delay which leads
to augmented UKP outperforming KPsec for this metric. However, the longer
key-path in SST increases the augmented SST key-exchange’s delay.
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Fig. 5. A comparison of the average end-to-end latency per connection.
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Fig. 6. A comparison of the average key-exchange delay.
We next measure the routing traffic overhead generated for sending the en-
crypted 5MB files. Fig. (7) shows this parameter measured in MB. Again, a
longer physical path degrades this parameter for both SST and augmented SST.
Fig. (8) shows the key-exchange traffic for end-to-end algorithms. This figure
shows that KPsec and augmented UKP generate almost similar volumes of key-
exchange traffic which is lower than augmented SST. While not shown here,
a network with stationary nodes is also simulated. The results show the same
pattern for all the mentioned parameters. However, for routing traffic, the net-
work with stationary node shows an average of 9% less overall routing traffic
and 11.5% less key-exchange traffic overhead. We have used the setting of [26]
to calculate the consumed energy for encryption and decryption processes in
our simulations. Fig. (9) shows the results for a network with different numbers
of nodes. Since PAKP encrypts data asymmetrically, it consumes an order of
magnitude more energy in comparison with other algorithms. Thus, we remove
its curve for better representation. The SST scheme has more intermediate D-E
steps in comparison with 2-UKP. Thus, it consumes energy at a rate almost twice
as large as that of 2-UKP. KPsec, in turn, outperforms the key pre-distribution
schemes by more than 70%. Since the data transmission process in all end-to-
end algorithms follows the shortest physical path and all of them use symmetric
encryption, their performance with respect to this metric is similar.
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Fig. 7. A comparison of the average network routing traffic.
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Fig. 8. A comparison of the average key-exchange traffic.
Overall, our results show that despite the fact that end-to-end solutions in-
cluding KPsec add some delay and traffic overhead, they remove the path stretch
and consequently result in better overall performance. They also show that, while
the performance of [18] depends on its underlying key pre-distribution scheme,
generally it is close to KPsec, performance-wise. However, in the following part,
we show that KPsec has significant security advantages over [18].
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Fig. 10. Average number of D-E steps and its effect on the network resiliency.
4.4 KPsec Improves Security
We first measure the average intermediate D-E steps in each disjoint path, as a
basic security metric. Fig. (10a) shows this parameter for different schemes. This
figure shows that the number of intermediate D-E steps in the KPsec algorithm
is significantly lower than those of augmented SST and augmented UKP. While
we represented a general analysis for resiliency against cooperative attacks in
Fig. (1), we combine the results of Fig. (10a) with the mentioned analysis to
show the resiliency of different algorithms. Fig. (10b) shows the results for a
network with 100 nodes, 10% of them being compromised, and different numbers
of disjoint paths. As Fig. (10b) shows, KPsec approaches to perfect resiliency
with only three disjoint paths, while this number is 5 and 8 for augmented
UKP and augmented SST, respectively. That is, KPsec can use a lower number
of disjoint paths to achieve higher performance for the same level of resiliency
against cooperative attacks.
Table 3. A brief security comparison.
Encryption Average Cooperative #Nodes Secure Subject
Algorithm System #D-E Attack for succ. Inform. to Passive
(per path) Resiliency SNC Leakage Attack
Aug. UKP Symmetric 4.145 0.95 10 Positive Positive
Aug. SST Symmetric 8.425 0.80 23 Positive Positive
KPsec Asymmetric 2.25 0.99 99 Negative Negative
One of the main advantages of KPsec is its resiliency against passive at-
tacks such as eavesdropping. Since all transferred keys in KPsec are public, an
attacker cannot degrade the computational hardness of the cryptosystem and
consequently cannot compromise the secrecy of data transmission, by eavesdrop-
ping. In contrast, a large enough number of compromised nodes in augmented
SST and augmented UKP enable the attacker to access the pairwise key only
by eavesdropping. Even if the attacker cannot eavesdrop all the key pieces in
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the algorithm of [18], it can access some key pieces and generate other parts
by a brute-force search. By considering the fact that the computational hard-
ness of symmetric cryptosystems exponentially increases by the increment of
key length [3], knowing any portion of the key is equivalent to the shorter key
length, and hence, it logarithmically decreases the computational complexity of
the brute-force attack [8]. In other words, the algorithm of [18] suffers from secure
information leakage. The next advantage of KPsec over symmetric end-to-end
solutions is the geographical distance of its overlay neighbors. In symmetric so-
lutions, the attacker can perform a jamming attack and force the source node
to establish its connection through a specific neighbor that the attacker desires
(i.e., a compromised node). In KPsec, by contrast, since the overlay neighbors
are, in most cases, physically far away and the physical neighbors carry only
encrypted messages, this attack becomes ineffective.
The next important security metric is the number of nodes that an attacker
needs to capture in order to compromise the security of the network as a whole.
This metric is sometimes referred to as the resiliency against selective node
capture (SNC) attacks. In symmetric key pre-distribution schemes, the key-pool
includes a limited number of secret keys. Hence, if the attacker knows about the
keyring arrangement, it can selectively capture nodes to get access to the entire
key-pool. In 2-UKP and SST, this number is O(
√
n) and O(k) nodes, respectively
[16]. Under PAKP, by capturing each node, the attacker accesses only several
public keys and only one private key. Hence, the attacker needs to capture O(n)
nodes to access all private keys. Table (3) summarizes and compares the security
of these schemes for a network with 100 nodes and three disjoint paths.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose KPsec to address two main shortcomings of exist-
ing key pre-distribution schemes: the intermediate D-E steps and path stretch.
KPsec establishes a pairwise key and makes end-to-end connections secure by
deploying a key-exchange process using overlay disjoint paths. We evaluate the
performance and security of KPsec as well as three state-of-the-art key pre-
distribution schemes using real testbed and large-scale simulations. Our results
show improvements in network throughput, end-to-end latency, and energy con-
sumption. This is because the overhead of deploying multiple overlay disjoint
paths is negligible in comparison with the performance benefits gained by re-
moving the path stretch. We show that KPsec requires fewer number of disjoint
paths to achieve the same level of resiliency against cooperative attack compared
to other multi-path solutions. Furthermore, contrary to other algorithms, KPsec
is resilient against passive attacks and does not suffer from the secure information
leakage. KPsec’s main goal is to protect the confidentiality of communications.
We leave the availability analysis for future work.
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